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Introduction
The cases which form the subject of this review brought into focus the interface and tension between two
major developments in criminal justice over the last two decades: the trend towards longer than normal
sentencing for ‘dangerous’ offenders and the rise of accredited offending behaviour programmes. 
Successive governments in the United Kingdom have legislated for more severe punishment for certain
categories of offenders. The Criminal Justice Act 1991 introduced longer than commensurate sentences
and revised extended sentences for violent and sexual offenders. The Crimes Sentences Act 1997 brought
in automatic life sentences for a second serious offence. More recently, sentencing legislation was
overhauled in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (the ‘Act’), which represented a further shift towards public
protection as the primary rationale in sentencing serious offenders2. One consequence of this shift has
been the increasing availability of, and requirement for, indeterminate sentences3. The general approach
of the Act is to introduce a new framework whereby offenders convicted of at least moderately severe
violent or sexual offences must be assessed for ‘dangerousness’ and if found to be a significant risk of
causing serious harm must receive heavier sentences for the purpose of public protection. The Act
introduced a statutory assessment of dangerousness containing a ‘statutory assumption of dangerous’,
meaning that an adult offender found guilty of a second or subsequent ‘specified’ violent or sexual offence
is assumed to be dangerous unless that assumption can be rebutted under s229(3). Specified offences are
listed in Schedule 15 of the Act, but are simply all violent or sexual offences carrying a maximum
sentence of two or more years’ imprisonment. Violent and sexual offences carrying a maximum sentence
of ten or more years’ imprisonment are further identified as ‘serious offences’. The Act created new
sentences for those identified as dangerous, including ‘imprisonment for public protection’ (‘IPP’) - an
indeterminate sentence for offenders convicted of a serious offence, but not meeting the requirements of
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imprisonment for life4. In the first two years after the Act came into force, more than 2,200 IPPs were
handed down5 and the number of ‘lifers’ detained on the prison estate rose by nearly 10%6. Official
estimates suggest over 10,000 prisoners will be detained in custody under an IPP by 20147 and they have
been identified as a cause of prison overcrowding8.
Historically, indeterminate sentences were largely reserved for offenders in whom a degree of ‘mental
instability’ had been demonstrated as per R v Hodgson (1967) 52 Cr App R 1139. In R v Wilkinson (1983)
5 Cr App R (s) 60, Lord Lane went so far as to state that discretionary life sentences were reserved,
broadly speaking, for those who could not be dealt with under mental health legislation, yet were in a
mental state which made them dangerous10. 
Therefore, it can be seen that under previous regimes, indeterminate sentences were given to offenders
exhibiting some degree of mental abnormality in a broader sense. Presumably, the new indeterminate
sentences introduced by the Act, including the IPP, ‘capture’ a similar group of mentally abnormal
offenders, as well as other serious offenders who are likely to have deficits in a range of domains including
interpersonal behaviour, social skills, pro-social problem-solving and consequential thinking in addition
to having histories of substance misuse.
The notion that one cause of offending is deficits in cognitive skills which can be made good (or least
diminished) through cognitive-behavioural therapeutic approaches, and in turn reduce recidivism, forms
the theoretical underpinning of cognitive skills programmes that have been introduced to UK prisons. In
the 1970s there was considerable pessimism about the effectiveness of rehabilitation interventions aimed
at reducing re-offending, encapsulated in the widely-held view that ‘nothing works’11. From the mid-
1980s, a body of research assembled which asserted that offending behaviour groupwork could produce a
4 The dangerous offender provisions of the Act (set out
within ss 225-228) introduced three new sentences for
adult offenders: (new) extended sentences, imprisonment
for public protection and imprisonment for life. Extended
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should be of such length as the court considers necessary
for protection of the public from serious harm from further
specified offences. 
Imprisonment for life is reserved for offenders who stand
convicted of an offence with a maximum sentence of life
imprisonment and, having satisfied the other conditions for
identification as a ‘dangerous offender’, also have their
offence considered serious enough by the court to justifiy
the imposition of a life sentence. Imprisonment for public
protection must be given to a dangerous offender
committing a serious offence for which life is unavailable
or where the other condition for life imprisonment is not
considered to be met. 
It should be noted that (1) the obligation to pass one of
these sentences, if the criteria are met, may be overridden
if the criteria requisite to the imposition of a hospital order
under section 37 Mental Health Act 1983, are satisfied
(see paragraph 38 Schedule 32 Criminal Justice Act
2003), and (2) greater judicial discretion is likely to be re-
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small but significant reduction in offending and became subsumed under the ‘What Works’ banner of
interventions12 13. These programmes are not without their critics and several studies have failed to
replicate positive findings14. Nevertheless, metanalyses seem to support the view that well-designed,
structured and targeted cognitive-behavioural approaches can reduce recidivism by around ten
percentage points15 and they were incorporated into a UK government strategy which adopted the ‘What
Works’ brand in 200016. 
These interventions are typically focussed, time-limited, structured and are delivered by trained staff in
prison and probation with the assistance of a training manual. In the UK, HM Prison Service now offers
thirteen fully or partially-accredited programmes covering such areas as enhanced thinking skills, anger
management and specific criminogenic attitudes such as those underpinning sexual offending17, although
the problem of access to such courses forms the basis of the current case. The need for such courses is
commonly written into sentence plans and reports from course facilitators are reviewed by the Parole
Board, as noted in James and Walker. 
The Facts
Mr Walker was convicted of two offences of sexual assault and given an IPP with a minimum term of 18
months, which expired in October 2007. Mr James was convicted of wounding with intent and given an
IPP with a minimum term of one year and 295 days which expired in July 2007. Both were detained at
HMP Doncaster, a local remand prison. This establishment had very limited resources for offending
behaviour work. Furthermore, neither offender was moved on to a ‘first stage’ lifer establishment or had
a sentence plan drawn up18. 
The report for the Parole Board prepared by Mr Walker’s Life Manager stated that although his behaviour
may have justified transfer to open conditions or release, the facts that he had no sentence plan and had
not undertaken work around relapse prevention meant that no recommendation could be made for
release or transfer to open conditions. Like Mr Walker, Mr James had received no formal sentence
planning. He had undertaken a short (2 week) alcohol-related course, but he had not the opportunity to
undertake several other courses that Parole Board reports indicated he probably needed. His Life
Manager similarly reported to the Parole Board that as he had not yet been given a sentence plan or
12 Blud L, Travers R, Nugent F. & Thornton D. (2003)
Accreditation of offending behaviour programmes in HM
Prison Service: ‘What Works’ in practice. Legal and
Criminological Psychology, 8, 69.
13 McGuire J. (1995) What Works: Reducing reoffending.
Guidelines from research and practice. Chichester: Wiley.
14 See, for example, Falshaw L, Friendship C, Travers R. &
Nugent F. (2004) Searching for ‘What Works’: HM
Prison Services accredited cognitive skills programmes.
British Journal of Forensic Practice 6(2), 3, which found
that two of the oldest and most established offending
behaviour programmes (Reasoning & Rehabilitation and
Enhanced Thinking Skills) did not reduce the short term
recidivism of prisoners released from English and Welsh
prisons.
15 Hollin C.R. (1999) Treatment Programs for Offenders:
Meta-Analysis, ‘What Works’ and Beyond. International
Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 22(3-4), 361.
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Practice. British Journal of Criminology, 45(5), 785.
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prison, a first stage establishment (high security or
category B), a second stage establishment (high security,
category B or category C) and a third stage establishment
(category D, open, semi-open or resettlement) before
release. The same policy states an intention that lifers will
move on from their local prison within approximately six
months. 
undertaken any work related to his offence, no recommendation for release or transfer to open conditions
could be made.
At Mr Walker’s judicial review, Laws LJ stated that it was an underlying premise of the new legislation
(the CJA 2003) that courses in the prison would be available to “maximise the opportunity for lifers to
demonstrate that they were no longer a danger to the public by the time their tariff expired (or as soon as possible
thereafter)”19 and that failure to provide the same was unlawful. He reasoned that an indeterminate
sentence comprised of a tariff element for punishment and a post-tariff element for public protection.
Only periodic assessment of the need for public protection could justify continued detention. In the
absence of effective assessment, detention could not be justified and was unlawful in common law
(although the decision in Cawser [2004] UKHRR 101 closed off any possibility that detention of a lifer
beyond his tariff period was in breach of ECHR article 5(1)).
At Mr James’s judicial review, Collins J applied the decision in Walker and held detention beyond tariff to
be unlawful. In this case the stakes were higher as James, unlike Walker, was already post-tariff. Collins J
decided that although it was, “potentially disastrous”20 his immediate release must be ordered. Mindful, not
unlikely, of the immense consequences of this decision to the population of post-tariff life prisoners, the
judge stayed his decision to give the Secretary of State the opportunity to appeal.
The Decision
The appeal was allowed in part. On the decision to order James’s immediate release, the Court of Appeal,
presided over by Lord Chief Justice Phillips, ruled that the finding that the detention of life prisoners
beyond their tariff in such circumstances was unlawful, was itself erroneous. Primarily, the Court accepted
the 2003 Act had made express statutory provision for the circumstances in which IPP prisoners may be
released:
“Central to this is the requirement that the Parole Board is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the
protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. It is not possible to describe a prisoner who
remains in accordance with these provisions as ‘unlawfully detained’ under common law. The common law
must give way to the express requirements of the statute”21
The Secretary of State’s success was limited to this (albeit important) aspect of the cases. 
The Secretary of State’s submission that he was not under any relevant duty to provide treatment or
training in prison was found to be “lacking in realism”22. His counsel asserted that there was no basis for
saying it was an underlying premise of the Act that he would provide IPP prisoners with the maximum
opportunity to demonstrate to the Parole Board that it was no longer necessary to detain them for the
protection of the public23. Furthermore, the appellant claimed it was for the independent Parole Board to
decide what evidence satisfied it that an IPP prisoner should be released and any fettering of its discretion
(such as by making release dependent on the completion of courses) would itself be unlawful24. 
In rejecting this submission, the Court of Appeal decided that the performance of the appropriate courses
is likely to be a prerequisite to a prisoner satisfying the Parole Board because experience had shown that
19 Walker v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2007] All ER (D) 479, para 26.
20 James v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2007] EWHC 2027 (Admin), para 10.
21 R v (on the application of Walker) v Secretary of State for
Justice; R (on the application of James) v Secretary of
State for Justice [2008] EWCA Civ 30 para 47.
22 Ibid, para 39.
23 Ibid, para 36.
24 Ibid, para 37.
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such courses are usually necessary if dangerous offenders are to cease to be dangerous, and highlighted
the significance of such evidence in current practice. The Court noted the Secretary of State had chosen
to bring the Act into force and yet had not provided the resources to give effect to his own policy of
offering these courses25. It concluded that this conduct breached his public law duty because its direct
and natural consequence was the detention of some prisoners beyond the time necessary either for
punishment or for the protection of the public, contrary to the intention of Parliament (and the object of
Article 5 of which Parliament must have been mindful).
The Court turned lastly to claims made on behalf of the prisoners that their treatment constituted
infringement of certain of their rights under article 5(1) and 5(4) of the European Convention of Human
Rights26. The Court reviewed the Strasbourg and domestic jurisprudence on indefinite detention. In
lengthy considerations it agreed that the legality of the post-tariff period of an indeterminate sentence
imposed for the public protection is dependent on the prisoner remaining a threat to the public and
reasoned:
“Article 5(4) requires this legality to be subject to periodic review by a body with the qualities of a court. If,
in the period between two such reviews a prisoner ceases to be dangerous, this will not mean that his detention
in the remainder of that period infringes Article 5(1). That article must be read in conjunction with Article
5(4) so as to produce a practical result. If, however, a review is unreasonably delayed and it is shown that, by
reason of the delay, the prisoner has been detained after the time that he should have been released, that period
of detention will constitute an infringement of Article 5(1).”27
Applying these tests to the cases before them, the Court considered whether the Parole Board could
review detention as required by Article 5(4) when offenders had not completed treatment courses. They
concluded that whilst this state of affairs would not formally prevent a case being heard, the review would
be an empty exercise and the outcome a foregone conclusion. For each claimant it found that if the
situation continued it would be likely to result in a breach of Art 5(4). However, their Lordships did not
apparently feel the delays were yet long enough for that breach to have taken place. 
There remained the question as to whether in the absence of periodic review the offenders were no longer
being detained for the object for which the IPPs were imposed, which would mean their detention could
not be justified under Article 5(1)(a). The Court accepted that if so long a time elapsed without a
meaningful review, detention would become disproportionate or arbitrary. However, without further
explanatory comments they decided that this stage had not been reached, and emphasised that failure to
comply would not in itself result in infringement of Article 5(1)(a). Nevertheless, the decision explicitly
left open the possibility that this article could be so infringed in the future.
Comment
The Secretary of State’s partial success has avoided the “potentially disastrous” prospect (identified by
Collins J. at first instance) of indeterminately detained dangerous offenders being released without
demonstrating they no longer represented a significant risk of serious harm to the public. However, the
conduct of the Secretary of State has been strongly criticised and held to be in breach of his public law
25 Ibid, para 40.
26 Mr Walker, who made his application before his tariff had
been reached, claimed that the unavailability of courses
had the potential to infringe his human rights. Mr James,
as a post-tariff lifer, submitted that in his case Article 5
had actually been breached.
27 R v (on the application of Walker) v Secretary of State for
Justice; R (on the application of James) v Secretary of
State for Justice [2008] EWCA Civ 30 para 61.
duty. The effect of such a ruling on policy and resource allocation is unclear. Ultimately, the likely future
infringement of Article 5(4) and potential future infringement of Article 5(1) may well prove to be more
important drivers for change, especially if a breach were to be determined at the ECtHR. The possibility
of an individual case progressing to the point at which a breach may be said to have occurred does not
seem fanciful. In its deliberations, the Court of Appeal endorsed the observations that flowed from R
(Noorkoiv) v Secretary of State [2002] EWCA Civ 770, in which the claimant successfully argued that a
delay of 2 months before a parole hearing (brought about by a policy of holding hearings quarterly to make
best use of resources) infringed his Article 5(4) right. A report published by the National Audit Office
soon after James & Walker gave timely information about delays currently experienced in the parole
system28. They found that only 32% of oral hearings for indeterminate sentences were being held on time.
One of the two most common reasons for deferrals was the Board not receiving the information required
to make a decision. In particular, 97 of 276 indeterminate cases did not contain either an Offender
Assessment System report (which would draw heavily on reports from offending behaviour courses) or a
life sentence plan. In these circumstances it is not difficult to envisage how a lengthy delay might occur.
In the longer term, the problem of offending behaviour programme provision and other problems arising
from having a large population of prisoners detained indeterminately with short tariffs may be ameliorated
to some extent by provisions of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill 2007, which is currently before
Parliament. Part of this wide-ranging bill seeks to amend the dangerous offender provisions of the Act.
Most significantly, in a notable volte-face by the Government, it intends to remove the statutory
assumption of dangerousness and also allow courts discretion in sentencing offenders who meet all the
criteria for IPP and extended sentences. There would still remain ample opportunity to impose
indeterminate sentences, but such amendments would probably reduce the numbers of those detained
indeterminately whose short tariff perhaps hints at the courts’ misgivings in handing down this type of
sentence in the first place.
In conclusion, this judgement confirms the right of indeterminately detained prisoners to access
appropriate offending behaviour programmes in a timely fashion. It affirms the regard in which
cognitively-oriented psychological and educational interventions are now held and the importance
placed on such work by criminal justice system. In the long view, all this seems far removed from the
period less than three decades ago when little in the way of psychological rehabilitation was viewed as of
any great proven worth. Debate may continue as to whether the statistically significant effects of these
courses equate to a significant reduction in recidivism or to value for money, but it looks as though they
will be offered ever more widely.
The relationship between mental disorder and crime is complex, controversial and well beyond the scope
of this article. We can say that offending behaviour courses in their current form attempt to bring about
changes in cognition (such as comparative thinking and paranoia) and behaviour (such as substance
misuse and emotionally dysregulated violence) which in some individuals will form part of a syndrome of
mental illness or other mental disorder. Indeed some courses, in particular substance misuse courses,
might be said to treat or prevent classifiable mental disorders specifically. We do know that the prison
28 National Audit Office (2008) Protecting the public: the work of the Parole Board. TSO: London.
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population as whole contains extremely high rates of mental disorder representing considerable unmet
need29. Thus, a significant proportion of those in line to participate in offending behaviour programmes
in prison will suffer from a mental disorder. The gold standard for treatment for severe mental disorder
may be transfer to hospital, but the majority of mentally disordered offenders are detained in prison. 
It is of interest when evaluating the status of prison-based programmes to reflect that psycho-educational
interventions offered in secure hospitals bear many similarities to prison courses and in some institutions
some of the very same courses are offered. In conclusion, it can be seen that many of the prisoners to
whom this judgment applies will have mental disorders, and in confirming the duty to provide cognitive-
behavioural interventions in prison, the Court of Appeal ought to have improved the likelihood of certain
mental health treatment needs being met.
29 Several large epidemiological studies have highlighted the high rates of mental disorder in all types of prisoner, as summarised in:
Birmingham L. (2003) The mental health of prisoners, Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 9, 191. Mental disorder (including
substance misuse diagnoses) was found in 37% of sentenced male prisoners and 57% of sentenced female prisoners in: Gunn J,
Maden A. & Swinton M. (1991) Mentally Disordered Prisoners, London: Home Office. Amongst remand prisoners, mental
disorder (also including substance misuse diagnoses) was found in 63% of male prisoners and 76% of female prisoners in:
Maden A, Taylor C, Brooke D. et al (1995) Mental Disorder in Remand Prisoners, London: Home Office. Even excluding
substance misuse diagnoses, about a quarter of men entering prison on remand were found to have some form of mental
disorder in: Birmingham L, Mason D. & Grubin D. (1996) Prevalence of mental disorder in remand prisoners: consecutive
case study, British Medical Journal, 313, 1521.
